But why do we organise the university the way we do in the first place?
All universities have faculties or schools and departments, do they not? There are the Sciences, Humanities, Engineering, Health Sciences, Commerce and Law at UCT, for example, each with their own histories, disciplinary territories, institutional cultures and, of course, budgets. Some universities might have some other faculty arrangements; maybe a faculty of Theology, Education, Arts or Agriculture, or the like. We are so accustomed to this arrangement that it seems natural.
Yet there is nothing particularly natural about it. The contemporary university's organisational structures are products of particular intellectual histories, political economies and institutional politics. They are not necessarily the most sensible way to organise knowledge. Disciplines can change faculties; faculties can merge. Some universities have 'schools' rather than faculties. Some have schools inside faculties. Life, certainly, is not organised into faculties, even if we think they are somehow natural.
Immanuel Kant wrote about the organisation of, and struggle between faculties in Der Streit der Fakultäten (all the way back in 1798). In there, he talks about why the state has an interest in supporting universities and why, in particular, historically the first three faculties, that is theology, medicine and law, are very much in the interest of the state (and therefore the "higher faculties") as against the fourth historical faculty, that is the faculty of philosophy (or "lower faculty") which is concerned with the freedom to examine truth claims; with reason. He explains how these faculties respectively relate to different interests of the state with regard to the organisation of its subjects, the people.
What if life was the reference point for organising knowledge and the organisation of knowledge would be logically the organisation of the university? Illness does not respect the boundaries between medicine, sociology, economics and psychology. Climate change is simultaneously a matter of natural science, technology, politics, culture and justice. What does it mean to study education without studying the society in which people learn, the economies in which they hope to work, and the political relations through which their futures are shaped?
What if Life, rather than the interest of the state, was the alternative starting point? What if not the relationship between knowledge, authority and power, but the relationships that enable Life were central?
What if the university accommodated the Life-in-relation imperative as its superlative knowledge interest? What if we began not with the relationship between knowledge, authority and power, but with the relationships that constitute and sustain Life? This need not imply that knowledge must always be immediately useful to Life. Nor that Life can somehow dictate what is true. Rather, could we imagine a university in which knowledge remains answerable to Reason, while its institutional organisation takes Life-in-relation as its fundamental reference point?
Kant was concerned with the university's existence within a political order, serving the public (or rather the state's) interests, and the importance of freedom of enquiry, freedom of reason, the freedom to examine, question, contradict, etc. (philosophy in its wider sense).
Thus, I don't disagree with Kant about the importance of the university as an institutional home that protects free rational enquiry. Quite the contrary. But what if we challenged the historical starting point from which he develops his argument: the university as an institution organised in relation to the interests of the state? What if we began instead with the fundamental relations that constitute Life itself as an organising principle for the university?
I therefore propose we begin with the fundamental relations that constitute Life itself as organising principle for a university. Human life in relation to other humans, to society, to technology, to the natural world, to history, to knowledge, and to the conditions of our collective flourishing, to the cosmos, indeed, within and beyond, deeper and wider.
I've been experimenting with what I tentatively call African life-in-relation knowledge domains. The idea draws on a relational understanding of knowledge and existence, including African humanist traditions, without suggesting that either African intellectual thought or relationality can be reduced to a single philosophy.
In my current sketch, seven broad domains emerge, respectively concerned with life and health; planetary relations; material life and livelihoods; technology and innovation; meaning and expression; social relations, justice and belonging; and learning, knowledge and human formation. They are not new faculties in disguise, nor are they intended as another set of administrative silos. They are ways of bringing scholarship into relation to fundamental dimensions of existence.
Let us be clear: disciplines matter. They are canonical repositories of accumulated knowledge, methods, value orientations, standards of argument and, most of all, scholarly communities. The point is not to dissolve them. It is to ask whether they should determine the fundamental organisational architecture of a university.
Similarly, we can easily reinvent the faculty system with more fashionable names. Or we could subordinate all scholarship to immediate social usefulness, leaving little room for curiosity-driven inquiry, fundamental science, critical scholarship and the intellectual freedom to pursue questions whose significance is not yet apparent. All this is worse and just leads to less knowledge.
Working in the African context, and ex Africa semper aliquid novi, there is also a distinctly African question here. Let's for now appreciate the European institutional inheritance - its transplantation onto African soil, but move on from that. Let's reconsider not only what knowledge the African university de facto produces, and those 'decolonial' question of whose knowledge counts; and then, revisit the question, how knowledge is institutionally organised.
What began as an organisational question has become an epistemological one. And, increasingly, a political one. Are you interested in what an African research university organised around life-in-relation looks like in practice. There are difficult questions about governance, resources, academic identities, disciplinary depth and institutional power. I am busy with them. But I am becoming rather convinced that the faculty structure should be an answer to a question, not an unquestioned starting point.
And perhaps that is where reimagining the African university may need to begin. A question to continue this argument and refine it may well be: If Life-in-relation becomes the organising principle of the university, should Reason be conceived as one of the relations constituting Life, or as the independent critical principle through which every proposed understanding of Life must be examined?





